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Abstract
In this paper, I spell out a descriptive account of agnosticism that captures
the intuitive view that a subject enters the mental state of agnosticism
via an act or event called suspension. I will argue that agnosticism is
a complex mental state, and that the formation of an attitude is the
relevant act or event by which a subject commits to indecision regarding
some matter. I will suggest a ‘two-component analysis’ that addresses
two aspects that jointly account for the settled state of agnosticism: (1)
the subject’s de facto indecision and (2) the subject’s commitment to her
indecision. Unlike meta-cognitivist or sui generis accounts, I do not take
the agnostic’s commitment to indecision as constitutive for her indecision
but rather as an evaluation or qualification of the indecision that she
already exhibits. Agnosticism, thus, is a settled form of indecision that
marks the end of inquiry.
Introduction
In this paper, I am interested in what people are doing when they enter the
mental state of agnosticism by an act or event called suspension. Thus, this is
primarily a philosophy of mind project that aims to give a descriptive account of
agnosticism. When I refer to accounts of agnosticism or suspension, what I mean
are descriptive accounts or at least descriptive elements of the accounts in the
literature. However, some aspects of my discussion will have consequences for
the normative profile of suspension and agnosticism that I will briefly mention
in Section 2.3.
I will restrict the discussion of suspension to inquiry-ending suspension,
which I take to be the relevant act or event that leads to agnosticism. This
is not to say that suspension necessarily brings inquiry to an end. There are
different kinds of suspension, I think, and we can make a distinction between
those that are inquiry-opening and others that are inquiry-ending. It is an inter-
esting question what makes these kinds of suspension fall under the same genus,
but it is not the question that I will address in this paper. Having said that,
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I will say a bit more about these two kinds of suspension in general (Section
1.1.2) and their respective roles for committing to indecision (Section 1.2.2).
The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I will establish six
requirements that have to be met by an appropriate analysis of the agnostic’s
mental state. I take these requirements to be adequacy conditions that can
be met in different ways by different accounts. To define these requirements, I
will refer to existing accounts in the literature but will also argue for additional
requirements that have not yet been addressed. In my discussion, I will also
point out how different accounts in the literature meet (or do not meet) the
respective requirements. I will dedicate the first group of requirements (Cog-
nitive Contact, Proper End, Lost Reasons) to Jane Friedman, who provided us
with reasons to abandon non-belief accounts for attitude accounts. The second
group of requirements that I will discuss (Doxastic Neutrality, Commitment, Re-
vision) will create problems for two popular versions of attitude accounts: the
sui generis account and reductive meta-cognitive accounts. It will be central to
clarify the role of non-agnostic indecision and the transition between the mental
states of agnostic and non-agnostic (or ‘mere’) indecision.
In the second part of the paper, I will spell out my own account of agnos-
ticism. I will argue that the relevant act of suspension that moves subjects
to agnosticism is the formation of the attitude of endorsement with respect
to their own indecision. The attitude of endorsement can be understood as a
certain form of commitment that specifically targets mental states. Only by en-
dorsing one’s de facto or ‘mere’ indecision, the subject suspends inquiry in the
appropriate way which leads her to the state of agnosticism. I will address the
indecision and the commitment to indecision as independent components that
are only structurally related. Unlike meta-cognitivist or sui generis accounts,
I do not take the agnostic’s commitment to indecision as constitutive for her
indecision but rather as an evaluation or qualification of the indecision that she
already exhibits. Agnosticism, thus, is a settled form of indecision that marks
the end of inquiry.
It may be useful to compare the notion of settling one’s indecision to the way
two-component glue works. Because the hardener and the resin are packed in
separate cartridges, the hardener does not bring about the resin, but if the two
are mixed together appropriately, the resin’s chemical structure is stabilised via
a chemical reaction. Likewise, the subject’s commitment to her own indecision
does not bring about that she is undecided but only stabilises, or settles, her
de facto indecision. Unfortunately, the glue metaphor is not perfect because
the chemical reaction is irreversible. This is not the case for one’s commitment
to indecision. Agnosticism can be revised, so I will argue, either by adopting a
belief or by giving up the endorsement of one’s indecision. If a subject’s revision
is prompted by undercutting defeaters, she can take back the commitment to
her indecision without thereby giving up her indecision altogether.
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1 Requirements for a Descriptive Account
In the following, I will discuss six requirements that descriptive accounts of
the mental state of agnosticism have to meet: in Section 1.1, I attribute the
first three requirements–Cognitive Contact, Proper End and Lost Reasons–to
Jane Friedman (2013b), who provided important counterexamples against non-
attitude accounts of agnosticism. These requirements support the view that
it is the formation of a certain attitude in virtue of which a subject suspends
and thereby enters the settled state of agnosticism. In Section 1.2, I will intro-
duce three further requirements that any attitude account of agnosticism has
to meet: Doxastic Neutrality, Commitment, and Revision. I will discuss these
requirements in the context of reductive and non-reductive attitude accounts.
1.1 Lessons from Friedman
1.1.1 Cognitive Contact
The most natural candidate for representing a subject’s indecision regarding
some proposition p is the property of lacking any doxastic attitude regarding
p.1 This privative state of non-belief must not be confused with disbelief and
is defined as follows: a subject S is in the state of non-belief with regard to a
proposition p if and only if S neither believes nor disbelieves that p. In contrast
to believing and disbelieving, non-belief is not an attitude the subject forms but
is a merely privative state of the subject.2 In other words, the state of non-belief
with respect to a proposition p is nothing but the joint absence of a believing
and a disbelieving attitude regarding p.
As philosophers have pointed out3, the fact that S is in the state of non-
belief with regard to p is insufficient for S being agnostic with regard to p,
because the mere absence of doxastic attitudes regarding p allows for S’s not
being (and never having been) cognitively in contact with p. Therefore, the first
requirement that an account of agnosticism has to meet is Cognitive Contact :
i. Cognitive Contact: Any account of agnosticism must make sure that a
subject cannot be agnostic toward a proposition (or a question) if she is
not or never was in cognitive contact with this proposition (or question).
1I treat questions as well as propositions as relevant objects for indecision and agnosticism.
Friedman takes the object of her sui generis attitude of suspension to be a question rather than
a proposition, as she spells out in Friedman (2013a; 2017). Even though I find Friedman’s
arguments convincing, I will not discuss the matter in this paper, because it is not relevant to
the points I am going to make about agnosticism. Because the positions in the debate I will
discuss predominantly use the propositional reading of suspension and agnosticism, I will not
always add the interrogative reading.
2I will treat ‘disbelieving that p’ as equivalent to ‘believing that not-p’, but nothing that
I aim to do here hinges on this treatment. The equivalence can be doubted; see Smart(2020)
“Disbelief is a Distinct Doxastic Attitude”.




The obvious solution for non-belief accounts to avoid the problem above would
be simply to add Cognitive Contact in the form of a second necessary condi-
tion for agnosticism, as Hájek (1998, p. 206), Wedgwood (2002, p. 272) and
Bergmann (2005, p. 421) do. However, even with this modification it is still
the case that non-belief is insufficient for agnosticism. Friedman (2013b) has
provided several examples in which a subject starts considering the truth of a
proposition that she had never thought about before, but, because of various
interruptions, never comes to the point where she actually suspends. In such
cases, the necessary condition of cognitive contact is satisfied (because the sub-
ject entertains p in thought) and S furthermore is in the state of non-belief (S
does not yet believe or disbelieve that p). But since deliberation may go on for
a while before S eventually suspends, it is possible that S is interrupted at a
time before she successfully entered the state of agnosticism. In such cases, S
opts out “in the midst of fixing one’s take on Φ” (Sturgeon 2010, p. 136) or
“mid-wondering” (Friedman 2013b, p. 170) and thus never takes the last step
of actually suspending.
This brings us closer to the intuitive view I stated at the beginning: sus-
pension is the relevant act or event by which doxastic deliberation about some
matter is put to an end in a certain way such that the subject enters the state of
agnosticism. Sean Crawford, who suggests a meta-cognitive analysis of suspen-
sion, or reservation of judgment, also subscribes to this idea when he states that
“the deliberative process terminates in a reservation of judgment with respect
to p” (Crawford 2004, p. 226, my italics). Similarly, Kurt Sylvan points out
that “among other things, an agnostic about p would conclude inquiry by being
resistant to believing p and being resistant to disbelieving p” (Sylvan 2016, p.
1652, my italics). In her 2013b paper, Friedman explicitly supports the intuitive
view that suspension is the relevant act or event that concludes a deliberative
process such that the subject enters the state of agnosticism:
Suspending judgment then can be thought of as one way of termi-
nating a deliberative process and (other things equal) moving into
a more settled state, viz., a state of suspended judgment or agnos-
ticism. Suspending then is (other things equal) a way of (at least
temporarily) terminating a deliberative process that is sufficient for
getting into a state of agnosticism. (Friedman 2013b, p. 179, my
italics)
Given this intuitive view and its broad acceptance, I suggest that an account of
agnosticism must meet the requirement I call Proper End.
ii. Proper End: An account of agnosticism should be able to explain the dif-
ference between subjects who close deliberation by suspending and those
who either drop out prematurely or close deliberation in some other way
than by suspending.
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Friedman’s position in her 2013b paper is in tension with the central claim
of a later paper (2017), namely, that suspension is the core interrogative atti-
tude and the beginning of all inquiry.4 This view has led to a new discussion
about different kinds of suspension, some of which are characterized as inquiry-
closing, whereas others are characterized as inquiry-opening. Errol Lord (2020)
and Kurt Sylvan (forthcoming), for example, distinguish kinds of suspension
in terms of “interrogative and anti-interrogative attitudes”, and Julia Staffel
argues that one kind of suspension belongs to the group of “terminal attitudes
we reach when we have finished a deliberation”(Staffel 2019, p. 284), whereas
another kind belongs to the group of “transitional attitudes” that are formed
at the start of or during deliberation. Although I share the view that there are
different kinds of doxastic suspension, I think that only the inquiry-closing kind
eventually leads to agnosticism. If we agree that agnosticism is a settled state,
it is only the inquiry-closing kind of suspension that is of interest to my project
here. Proponents of inquiry-opening suspension indirectly support the view
that settling is closely connected to closing the question. Staffel, for example,
contends that transitional, that is, inquiry-opening attitudes “lack the stabil-
ity and settledness of terminal attitudes” (p. 286); and Errol Lord states that
“anti-interrogative [inquiry-closing] attitudes involve agnostic determination”,
(Lord 2020, p. 136) whereas interrogative attitudes do not.5
As we can see, the requirement Proper End is not in opposition to the view
that there is also an inquiry-opening kind of suspension; it only restricts the
kind of suspension that leads to the settled state of agnosticism to those acts or
events that close inquiry.6 The settled state of agnosticism, as I understand it,
is only achieved by ending, terminating, or closing inquiry by an act or event
we call suspending. This requirement is not a requirement for an account of
suspension in general but rather a requirement for an account of agnosticism
that has to identify the relevant act or event that brings deliberation to an end
and moves the subject into the agnostic state. In order to make sense of the
doxastic Triad (belief, disbelief, agnosticism) the kind of suspension required for
entering the settled agnostic state has to have the same effect on deliberation
as the adoption of belief and disbelief has.7 Coming back to Friedman’s view,
4I will not discuss this tension here. See recent discussions of Friedman’s new position by
Archer (2018; 2019), Atkinson (2021), Masny (2020), McGrath (2021).
5I have to point out, though, that the concept of a ‘settled stance’ is used differently by
different authors. For example Lord and Sylvan (forthcoming) contend that “[b]oth sorts of
attitudes are forms of settled neutrality” (p. 10).
6I want to thank an anonymous reviewer who suggested addressing this point in more
detail. I will come back to this when I introduce the requirement Commitment in Section
1.2.2.
7Friedman (2019) argues for (flat-out) belief having exactly this effect on inquiry (in con-
trast to credences): “Having a belief means having a settled opinion since (normally) a p-
believer isn’t also inquiring into questions that have p as a complete answer” (p. 307). My
claim that the kind of suspension relevant to the settled state of agnosticism is required to
end inquiry does not deny the existence of inquiry-opening suspension. The only thing I do
deny is that inquiry-opening suspension leads to a settled state of agnosticism. I don’t mean
this to be a disagreement about words, but the traditional use of the ‘a-gnostic’ is someone
who does not know and is content with this being so. The traditional mind-set of the agnostic
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this act or event seems best captured by the adoption of an attitude.
Note that talk of ending a deliberation process properly and (not) ending it
prematurely is not meant to indicate a normative requirement for the subject
involved. Premature interruption can occur in cases where a subject should have
closed the matter long before, but still engages in irrational deliberation, such as
when S constantly checks on something where, objectively, no new evidence or
insight is to be gained. Additionally, a subject may close deliberation properly
by suspending even if, from a rational point of view, there might still be lots
of evidence to be reviewed and deliberated about. A descriptive account has to
allow for irrational suspension and agnosticism.8
1.1.3 Lost Reasons
In another move against non-attitude accounts of agnosticism, Friedman argues
that these accounts provide bad results for cases in which subjects lose the
reasons for which they originally suspended but nonetheless remain agnostic.
According to Friedman, we want to allow for subjects to remain in the
agnostic state after having lost their original reasons because “reasons look
separable from the state” (Friedman 2013b: 176). Let us agree with Friedman
that an account of agnosticism needs to make sure that the agnostic state can
be upheld independently of whether the reasons for which one originally entered
that state are at some later time defeated or not. Further, we want an account of
agnosticism to allow that subjects forget the reasons for which they suspended
without thereby leaving the agnostic state. All of these cases speak for the Lost
Reasons requirement:
iii. Lost Reasons: An account of agnosticism must allow that S continues to
be agnostic despite having lost the reasons for which S originally entered
that state.
Note that Lost Reasons is no rationality requirement either. It is one ques-
tion whether subjects should keep track of the relations between their mental
states and their reasons for being in these states and another question whether
they actually do. No matter how the normative question will be answered,
findings in cognitive psychology suggest that we often do stick to our beliefs
even if the relevant reasons have been defeated.9 There is no good argument
why this should be any different with agnosticism. If we think that subjects
typically enter the state of agnosticism for a reason, then a descriptive account
does not contain an intrinsic motivation to find the answer one lacks by actively inquiring
further. This does not mean, of course, that agnosticism cannot be temporary. It only means
that for the time the subject is agnostic, she does not inquire into the matter she is agnostic
about - in the same sense as belief is often subject to change.
8In Wagner (forthcoming ), I argued that suspension is indeed a way to avoid epistemic
conflict. In cases in which a subject’s conflict stems from a genuine epistemic dilemma, it is
clearly irrational to suspend though it is the best a subject can do in this situation to settle
her conflicted state of mind (despite remaining in the dilemmic situation).
9See Anderson (1995), Anglin (2019) and Nestler (2010).
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of agnosticism needs to provide the means to cover phenomena where subjects
lose their reasons for agnosticism but nonetheless remain in the agnostic state.
1.1.4 Summary
The overall lesson from Friedman (2013b) is that accounts involving an attitude
fare best at accommodating the view that a subject enters the state of agnos-
ticism by an act or event that closes doxastic deliberation in the right way. In
light of the three discussed requirements, it is fair to say that (i) the presence
of an attitude toward a proposition or question guarantees cognitive contact of
the relevant sort, (ii) the proper way of bringing deliberation to an end can be
captured by the formation of an inquiry-closing attitude, and (iii) an attitude
and the reasons for which the attitude has been formed are separable from each
other.
However, at this point, nothing has been said about the kind of attitude
that is suitable for bringing the subject into the state of agnosticism. In the
next section, I will introduce further requirements that concern the nature of
the sought-after attitude, its object, and the resulting structure of the (poten-
tially complex) state of agnosticism. I will discuss whether and how competing
attitude accounts of agnosticism meet these requirements and point out some
problems. In particular, I will focus on Friedman’s non-reductive account of
a sui generis attitude and on different meta-cognitive accounts that reduce ag-
nosticism to a complex state that has as its core element a certain belief about
one’s own deficient epistemic situation.
1.2 Indecision and Agnosticism
In this section, I will mainly discuss the distinction of the mental states of in-
decision and agnosticism, as well as the transition from one to the other. In
Section 1.2.2, I will explore the relevant additional component that accompa-
nies agnosticism but is absent in merely undecided subjects. I will argue in
accordance with most contributors that unlike the merely undecided subject,
the agnostic subject is committed to indecision for a reason and that this com-
mitment is best captured by means of an attitude. My interpretation of what
it is to commit to indecision will be very different from other accounts, though.
In Section 1.2.3, I will ask what a subject is doing when she revises her
agnostic stance in a situation in which her initial reasons for agnosticism have
been rebutted or undercut. An adequate theory of agnosticism, so I argue, has
to be able to account for the difference of undercutting and rebutting defeaters
for agnosticism, and I will show that this is done best by paying attention
to the internal structure of the complex mental state of agnosticism. However,
before I turn to the requirements Commitment and Revision, I need to elaborate




In Section 1.1, we saw on the basis of Friedman’s counterexamples that non-
belief accounts fail to establish a subject’s agnosticism and that an attitude
needs to be involved to make sure that the subject enters the state of agnos-
ticism in the proper way and for a reason. But what is it that makes the
mental state of agnosticism a doxastic stance? Plausibly, the relevant feature
that makes agnosticism with respect to p a doxastic stance is the fact that an
agnostic subject is undecided or neutral regarding p’s truth. In contrast to mere
non-belief, doxastic indecision or neutrality has to have some (at least mini-
mal) bearing on the evidence the subject has (or the fact that there is none).
Arguably, a subject who neither believes nor disbelieves that p is true could
be described as doxastically neutral (or ‘merely’ undecided) regarding p’s truth
only if she meets the requirement Cognitive Contact.
Friedman, however, promotes a sui generis attitude of ‘being agnostic’ that is
in itself indecision-representing and concludes from this perspective that “non-
belief is not required (except rationally, perhaps)” (Friedman 2013b, p. 169)
for an account of agnosticism after all. By contending that “[t]he indecision
of the agnostic is not the indecision of mere non-belief” (p. 177), Friedman
seems to assume that there are two kinds of indecision that differ with respect
to their nature and can be found in subjects independently of each other.10 It
is, however, only because of a peculiarity of the promoted sui generis attitude
that the indecision of mere non-belief seems not to be required for describing
the subject’s agnosticism, or so I will argue.
Let me illustrate this with the help of the meta-cognitive account that Fried-
man explicitly mentions as a possible candidate for an attitude account of ag-
nosticism: “One plausible option that has emerged is that the attitude one has
when one suspends about p is just a belief: in particular a belief about one’s
(somehow deficient) first-order epistemic or doxastic standing with respect to
p” (p. 180). Friedman contends that “thoughts about one’s own epistemic
perspective on whether or not p are plausibly indecision-representing attitudes
(with respect to p)” (p. 175). However, it is important to understand that a sui
generis attitude of being agnostic represents indecision in a very different way
than the meta-cognitive belief regarding one’s epistemic stance does. Whereas
the assumed attitude of ‘being agnostic’ is supposed to represent or express the
subject’s indecision toward the respective proposition or question that is its ob-
ject, the attitude of believing obviously does not. To the contrary, if S believes
that p is true, then S is not undecided or neutral with respect to p’s truth.
Rather, S’s meta-cognitive belief represents (according to the view of the
meta-cognitivist at least) S’s indecision toward a proposition p because of the
content of her belief, that is, her deficient epistemic perspective regarding p.
10In her 2017 paper, this view is even clearer: “In taking the attitudinal approach to
suspension for granted I take it that S’s not believing that Rover broke the vase and not
believing that he didn’t break the vase is not sufficient for S’s suspending judgment about
whether Rover broke the vase. In fact, I don’t think that S’s lacking those beliefs is necessary
either” (Friedman 2017, p. 305).
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The content of the meta-belief is not the proposition p which S is supposed
to be undecided about but another proposition that represents S’s epistemic
situation with respect to p. Therefore, it is not in virtue of the attitude of
believing that the subject counts as undecided, but in virtue of the content that
she believes: for example, that she is in an epistemically problematic situation
with respect to the truth of p, that she ought not to adopt a belief regarding p
given her evidence, or that it cannot be determined whether p is true or not.11
All of these contents have one thing in common: they represent or express
the subject’s doxastic neutrality regarding the truth of p by means of non-belief
with respect to p.12 Thus, for meta-cognitive accounts, it is not the case that,
as Friedman thinks, “the indecision of mere non-belief is not required”. This
may also be true for other reductive attitude-accounts of agnosticism that are
not indecision representing in the particular way of the sui generis attitude of
being agnostic. Hence, the question of whether the indecision of non-belief is (or
is not) necessary for describing agnosticism depends on the question of whether
a subject’s indecision can or cannot be properly captured by the respective
account in some other way. To keep open the different ways of modelling the
state of agnosticism (at this point of the paper at least), I suggest the following
modest requirement:
iv. Doxastic Neutrality: An attitude account of agnosticism has to explain
according to which feature an agnostic subject is genuinely undecided or
neutral regarding the truth of the matter in question.
As we have seen, Friedman’s sui generis attitude of being agnostic is de-
fined such that it expresses or represents the subject’s indecision regarding a
proposition or question by itself. Additionally, her notion of agnostic indecision
is psychologically independent from the indecision that comes with non-belief.
The ontological commitment to two different kinds of indecision is not particu-
larly parsimonious and it seems difficult to explain why the agnostic is undecided
about the truth of a proposition in a genuinely different way than the merely
undecided. I will further elaborate on this in the next section.
1.2.2 Committing to Indecision
As we saw in the last section, mere indecision in the form of non-belief does
not qualify for agnosticism. On this point, there is no disagreement between
11Different meta-cognitivist accounts suggest different contents for the relevant meta-belief.
Crawford (2004), for example, contends that, as an agnostic, one has “thoughts about one’s
own epistemic perspective on whether or not p, namely, that one’s epistemic perspective falls
short of establishing whether p” (p. 226). Rosenkranz (2007) takes “the assertion that we
are neither in a position to know p nor in a position to know ‘¬p’” as required for his notion
of “True Agnosticism” (p. 461). Raleigh (2021) introduces the “belief or opinion that one
cannot yet tell whether or not p” to be based on one’s evidence (p. 2455).
12In fact, most meta-cognitivists take non-belief to be necessary for agnosticism. Crawford:
“since to suspend judgement with respect to something is (at least) neither to believe nor
disbelieve that thing” (Crawford 2004, p. 224); Raleigh: “Suspending whether p also requires
that the subject is in a neutral doxastic state with respect to p – i.e. she neither believes that
p nor disbelieves that p” (Raleigh 2021: 2457).
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the proponents of a sui generis attitude account and a meta-cognitive account
of agnosticism. So what exactly is it that a merely undecided subject lacks
but the agnostic subject exhibits? It is often said that the agnostic state of
mind brings with it a certain commitment to indecision that is absent from
the mental state of the merely undecided.13 Meta-cognitivists and proponents
of the sui generis approach further agree that an attitude account seems best
suited to deliver the relevant commitment to indecision, because the formation
of an attitude typically comes with a certain commitment. Different attitudes,
however, come with different commitments, and details are needed about what
kind of commitment is required for agnosticism.
Generally, there are two ways of understanding a subject’s commitment to
indecision: (A1) The commitment to indecision can be understood as the sub-
ject’s aim to not yet decide with respect to the truth of some matter and as such
can be regarded as bringing about or maintaining the mental state of indecision.
This is plausible when we think of a subject who aims to make up her mind
about some question in an impartial or neutral way, or simply to find out the
truth about some matter. (A2) Alternatively, a commitment to indecision can
be understood as a qualification or an assessment of one’s de facto indecision,
that is, the state of indecision in which the subject finds herself regarding the
truth of some matter. By committing to her own indecision in this way, the sub-
ject does not have the aim of being in a state of indecision but rather assesses
the fact that she is in that state.
We can address this difference between the two ways of being committed
to indecision from the perspective of inquiry: in the former description of a
commitment to indecision as in A1, a subject temporarily commits herself to
neither believing nor disbelieving p for the purpose of reviewing or gathering
relevant evidence. This commitment has the subject bound to holding back any
potentially premature judgment with respect to p for the sake of an impartial
and critical assessment of the evidence. This fits well with the description
of suspension involving an “interrogative attitude”, as has been proposed by
Friedman (2017), Lord and Sylvan (2020; forthcoming) and also Staffel (2019).
The attitudes they suggest come with a commitment to becoming or remaining
(at least temporarily) undecided to support and guide a subject’s inquiry into
some matter.
The alternative description of a commitment to indecision relates to inquiry
in the opposite way. A subject who commits to indecision per A2 is already
undecided with respect to the matter in question, typically because of her de-
ficient evidential situation. The subject’s commitment here is a commitment
13See, for example, Rosenkranz (2007), p. “True Agnosticism [...] is stable enough to
generate commitments with respect to the debate’s future course, and thus is more than a
mere refusal to adopt any stance at all” (p. 101); Sturgeon (2010): “[S]uspended judgment is
a non-trivial kind of judgement, a non-trivial kind of committed neutrality. The joint absence
of belief and disbelief is no kind of judgement at all, no kind of commitment” (p. 136);
Friedman (2013b): “Non-belief cannot be the agnostic’s only sort of indecision. But how else
can we capture S’s indecision now except by way of an attitudinal commitment to indecision?”
(178); Sylvan (2016): “Agnosticism consists in settled resistance to belief on the evidence—a
committed neutrality relative to one’s evidence” (p. 1653).
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to her de facto state of indecision (with regard to p) and results in stopping
further inquiry (into p). The subject’s formation of the attitude in question is
some sort of assessment or evaluation of her own doxastic state of indecision:
in the context of her evidential situation, S may assess her indecision to be
appropriate, permissible, or even obligatory, take her evidence to be inadequate
to decide the issue at the moment and may even judge the question at hand to
be undecidable. In such cases, S’s indecision is the object of her commitment,
not its aim. By taking a stance toward her own doxastic state regarding p, S
(at least temporarily) terminates or suspends further inquiry into the question
whether p. It is fair to say that suspension in the form of an “anti-interrogative
attitude” (Lord 2020) or a “terminating attitude” (Staffel 2019) is perfectly
compatible with my proposed commitment to indecision as in A2 (even though
the quoted authors follow a different agenda than is suggested here).
I want to argue that the second way of understanding a subject’s commit-
ment to indecision (A2) is suited to distinguishing the merely undecided subject
from the agnostic subject. The termination of inquiry by a subject’s commit-
ment to her own mental state of indecision provides the required stability or
settledness of agnosticism that the merely undecided subject lacks. By assess-
ing her own doxastic state of indecision regarding p, S gains a settled perspective
with respect to the truth of p without having established whether p is true or
not. S enters the state of agnosticism via forming an attitude by which she
commits herself to her own de facto indecision and terminates inquiry. A sub-
ject who commits to this fact identifies with her own indecision and adopts her
indecision as her own. Committing to indecision in this way is the relevant
step toward agnosticism that the merely undecided subject lacks. The theistic
agnostic, for example, settled on a neutral opinion with respect to the exis-
tence of a god and does not inquire the issue any further. Sure, there might be
circumstances that, if the agnostic were to face them, would even lead her to
change her view, but this is no different with any other settled opinion like that
of belief or disbelief.14
The commitment to being undecided per A1, however, cannot be the kind of
commitment needed for agnosticism. If a subject is committed to refrain from
adopting any doxastic stance for the sake of inquiring further into the matter,
then the agnostic stance is among those things that S aims to avoid. Simply
put, the point of committing to indecision in terms of A1 is not to settle the
issue in question at this point.15
Thus, the fifth requirement for an account of agnosticism is to explain the
14Similar points have been made by Friedman (2013b, p. 173) and Raleigh (2021, p. 2468).
15It may seem inappropriate, though, to refer to a subject who aims at keeping an open
mind for the sake of inquiry as “merely” undecided. Adopting and maintaining this state of
mind clearly requires a more sophisticated mental setting than the mere absence of belief and
disbelief with respect to some proposition one entertains in thought. In some cases, substantive
mental effort will be required for not jumping to conclusions and remaining undecided despite
there being all kinds of temptations to make an early call. Nevertheless, a subject who fights
off these temptations to believe or disbelieve p in the process of a thorough deliberation with
the aim of finding out the truth is not agnostic with respect to p because she treats the
question of whether p as open and has not yet settled on a position regarding that matter.
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nature of the commitment to indecision that distinguishes the agnostic’s mindset
from that of the merely undecided subject in the following way:
v. Commitment: An attitude account of agnosticism has to capture the
subject’s commitment to indecision by means of an attitude such that the
subject settles her de facto indecision regarding a proposition or question
and stops further inquiry.
Let us consider the two popular attitude accounts and the attitudes they suggest
for capturing the agnostic’s commitment to indecision. Do these attitudes meet
requirement v? One might think that a sui generis attitude of ‘being agnostic’
can simply be defined to bring about the right kind of commitment for agnos-
ticism. It is problematic, however, that the primitive state of agnosticism does
not have any internal structure that could explain the subject’s commitment to
her de facto indecision as an act of assessing her own doxastic state. Hence,
we can only stipulate that being in this state not only expresses the subject’s
doxastic indecision regarding the truth of p but also brings with it the relevant
commitment to this indecision regarding p. Because the indecision and the com-
mitment to this indecision are not separable, the sui generis account has less
explanatory force, so I argue. In the next section, I will explain why this lack of
structure within the primitive state of agnosticism creates an additional prob-
lem in the context of revising one’s agnostic state in the face of undercutting
defeaters.
Meta-cognitive accounts, it would appear, are in a better position here be-
cause, in principle, they have the required structure to meet Commitment and
thereby explain the subject’s assessment of her own indecision. Not all meta-
cognitive accounts, however, use this structure in the way Commitment de-
scribes. I will briefly discuss two different meta-cognitive approaches, one that
Sean Crawford suggested and the other that Thomas Raleigh suggested, and
explain why I think that they both ultimately fail or are at least insufficient for
agnosticism.
Crawford (2004) suggests that “[s]uspension of judgement necessarily in-
volves thoughts about one’s own epistemic perspective on whether or not p,
namely, that one’s epistemic perspective falls short of establishing whether p
and thus that one does not know whether p” (226). Clearly, by forming a belief
regarding one’s deficient epistemic situation, the subject takes a stance toward
her own indecision. But can the attitude of believing deliver the right kind of
commitment that puts an end to inquiry and settle the question whether p? I
don’t think so. Why would believing that I am undecided due to insufficient
evidence keep me from further inquiring into the matter of p? S may come to
believe that she is undecided about the truth of p and that she is undecided
due to her lack of evidence. Nevertheless, she may be motivated to change this
fact about her doxastic state regarding p and start a thorough investigation into
the matter with the aim of finding out whether or not p. This is not what the
agnostic does. I agree that any assessment of one’s own indecision requires that
one be aware of one’s own indecision – and in this respect, my account will be
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very close to the meta-cognitive view. Ultimately, though, I do not think that
the awareness of one’s doxastic state alone can be sufficient for establishing the
transition from being merely undecided to being agnostic.16
Raleigh (2021) takes another approach to meta-cognitivism. Similarly to
Crawford, he argues that “[s]uspending whether p constitutively requires hav-
ing a belief or opinion that one cannot yet tell whether or not p, based on one’s
evidence” (p. 2455). This meta-belief, according to Raleigh, provides the rele-
vant commitment to indecision only if the meta-belief serves as an explanatory
and a motivating reason for the subject to neither believe nor disbelieve the
proposition in question: “we want the meta-cognitive belief to be the subject’s
motivating reason for the doxastic neutrality and not just a merely causal-
explanatory reason” (p. 2457). In this setting, the answer to the question of
how to distinguish the merely undecided subject from the agnostic can thus
be spelt out in two ways: Either the merely undecided subject’s indecision is
pictured as an uninformed state that is not related to her epistemic situation
because she, in contrast to the agnostic, simply lacks the essential meta-belief
and does not reflect on her epistemic situation at all; alternatively, the merely
undecided subject can be described as an irrational subject who, while having
formed the relevant meta-belief, is not motivated by it. In the latter case, the
difference between the merely undecided and the agnostic would be a matter of
rationality.
Let us consider the commitment to indecision that Raleigh proposed. As it
stands, the commitment that comes with the attitude of belief cannot be the
commitment that is characteristic of agnosticism, because, as Raleigh empha-
sises, merely having the required meta-belief does not yet guarantee that the
subject actually takes it as a reason for her indecision. Therefore, there seems
to be an additional commitment to act on one’s meta-belief and take it as a
reason for one’s doxastic neutrality. So what exactly what does it mean to take
one’s meta-belief as a reason for one’s neutrality? What kind of act or event is
this supposed to be?
Here is a plausible scenario: S, let us assume, starts out believing that p
but then reconsiders her evidence and forms the meta-belief that she actually
cannot yet tell whether or not p is true. In this situation, S will, if rational,
take the newly acquired meta-belief as a reason for giving up her initial belief
that p. After having dropped the initial belief that p, S ends up in the state of
non-belief with regard to p and, thus, is neutral or undecided about p’s truth.
Here, it is indeed true that S’s newly acquired indecision regarding p is causally
explainable and motivated by her meta-belief, which S took as a reason for
giving up her former belief that p. Indeed, in this case S commits to indecision
by taking her meta-belief (that her epistemic position with respect to p’s truth
is deficient) to be a reason for dropping her belief that p. However, by doing so
S does not settle her indecision in the sense of A2, as is required for agnosticism,
but rather in the sense of A1. The resulting state here is not a qualification of
16To be fair, Crawford does not claim that forming the relevant meta-belief suffices for
agnosticism; he only takes it to be necessary for suspension.
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one’s indecision but only indecision simpliciter. S takes the meta-belief to be a
reason to become undecided by dropping the belief that p.
Not every mental process that leads to indecision is achieved by dropping
an initial belief in the way described above. It is also natural that a subject
starts deliberating into p’s truth while she is already undecided (in the sense
of p-non-belief) and then, after having reviewed the evidence, forms the meta-
belief that she cannot yet tell whether or not p is true. It is a natural process to
start deliberating into something one does not know and then realize that the
evidence is insufficient to decide the issue after all. According to Raleigh’s view,
the subject I described counts as agnostic only if her indecision is motivated and
explained by the meta-belief that she acquired during deliberation. Since this
subject is undecided regarding p at all stages of her deliberation, it is difficult to
identify the act for which the meta-belief is taken to be the motivating reason.
Thus, the question arises what there is left to do for the prospective agnostic
subject such that she can be properly described as being motivated by her
meta-belief. What mental act is the meta-belief a reason for? It is unclear how
to describe the natural transition from mere indecision to agnosticism that is
motivated and explained by the meta-belief if the required connection between
the subject’s meta-belief and her resulting indecision is not brought about by an
additional mental act or event that is different from the formation of meta-belief
itself.
As an anonymous reviewer suggested, the relevant decision that distinguishes
the merely undecided and the agnostic subject could be the decision to remain
undecided: whereas the agnostic subject thinks or is disposed to think “Given
my evidence, I cannot tell whether p or not-p, and on this basis, I should not
believe either p or not-p”, the merely undecided subject does not think or is not
disposed to think this thought. I agree that this distinction helps to distinguish
(rational) subjects who respond to their meta-belief and (irrational) subjects
who do not. But I do not think that this is a distinction between those who
are merely undecided and those who actually entered the state of agnosticism.
I want to respond to this suggestion by arguing that being disposed or even
motivated to think a normative thought does not suffice for the subject to act
on its content.
Suppose I subscribed to Skepticism because I thought that, given the evi-
dence, I should not believe that there is an outside world and I also should not
believe that there is no outside world. Ultimately, however, I fail and just do
believe that there is an outside world. This is perfectly compatible with still up-
holding the meta-belief that I really should not believe or disbelieve that there
is an outside world given the evidence. Even though my meta-belief makes me
have these thoughts about how I should behave doxastically, I just fail in doing
so. This may be irrational, but it is not impossible and I think it happens a lot
that we have beliefs that we think we ought not to have given the evidence.17
17We know that racist and sexist thoughts or stereotypes of any kind can occur in a similar
setting, where people realize that they actually have beliefs they think they should not have.
It is not always easy to drop them even if having the right kind of dispositions to think what
is to believe or not to believe.
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The conclusion I draw from this is that merely thinking a thought with a norma-
tive content is insufficient for actually doing what is rationally demanded given
that I believe the content. Hence, I think that the basic meta-cognitive view
needs an additional act (for which the meta-belief can serve as a motivating
reason) that is not itself a belief or a disposition to think certain thoughts. In
the second part of the paper, I will explain in more detail what kind of act I
have in mind.18
1.2.3 Revising Agnosticism
The different attitude accounts of agnosticism agree that the agnostic state is
motivated by a reason and can be rendered more or less justified in light of the
respective motivating reasons. Reasons can be defeated, though, as we have seen
in the discussion of the requirement Lost Reasons in Section 1.1.3. Friedman
uses an intriguing example to show that losing one’s reasons for agnosticism
does not automatically lead to a change of mind. People may stick to their
agnostic mindset even if the reasons for which they originally entered that state
have been defeated. In this section, I want to argue that even if it is correct
that losing one’s reason does not guarantee a change of mind, it can lead to that
result, and it is plausible that, in some cases, it actually does. An account of
agnosticism needs to be able to explain both of these outcomes if the relevant
reason for having entered the agnostic state has been defeated: (a) the subject
does not change her mind and remains agnostic, and (b) the subject does change
her mind about the issue in question and gives up her agnosticism. Whereas
the Lost Reasons requirement deals with outcome (a), I want to attribute the
requirement Revision to outcome (b).
We established in the last section that subjects enter the agnostic state by
committing to their de facto indecision. If S commits to her indecision for a
reason, S may give up her commitment once her reason is defeated (and she is
aware that this is so). There are two points worth discussing: first, reasons can
be defeated in different ways which have to be taken into account; and second,
because the structure of agnosticism in terms of committing to one’s indecision
is more complex than first-order doxastic states like belief or disbelief, this will
have consequences for the question of how to revise one’s agnosticism.
Consider the case of a subject who is agnostic with regard to a proposition p
and then comes across new evidence containing a prima facie reason for believing
(or disbelieving) p. A prima facie reason like this may also be called a rebutting
defeater. Clearly, if S is rational and encounters evidence that speaks for the
truth of p, then S will start believing that p is true and thus will stop being
undecided about p’s truth. If agnosticism is a commitment to one’s de facto
indecision, a rational subject has to retract this commitment: by believing p
to be true, she is not undecided regarding p’s truth anymore. Although it is
conceptually impossible that S is undecided and decided with regard to p’s
truth at the same time, we could think of an irrational subject sticking with
18I want to thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.
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her past commitment to her former indecision even though she is not undecided
anymore. A structure that separates one’s indecision and the commitment to
one’s indecision is able to explain what is going on in these cases.
For example, we could think of a subject who has been agnostic about p for
most of her life and then (maybe against her practical interests or dogmatic belief
system) comes to believe that p on the basis of new evidence that she cannot
ignore. Despite forming the belief that p, she may encounter psychological
difficulties with regard to disowning her long-kept commitment to indecision
regarding p, and her cognitive adaptation to the new reality may take a while.
It seems plausible to say that she believes that p and is thus not undecided with
respect to p’s truth, but still is committed to her former indecision. This is
clearly irrational, and the normative profile of agnosticism cannot allow for this
mindset. Therefore, the structure of the agnostic state makes it necessary to
check for the rationality of indecision and that of the commitment to indecision
separately.19
Consider another case of a subject S who is agnostic with regard to a propo-
sition p and then comes across new evidence that undermines her original rea-
son for agnosticism but which, at the same time, does not constitute a reason
against S’s indecision with respect to p. We may call a reason like this an un-
dercutting defeater.20 In a situation like this, it is rational for the subject to
remain undecided because she has no reason for believing or disbelieving that
p is true. However, she is required to give up her commitment to her indeci-
sion. I will argue with the help of an example that this situation can only be
captured by an account of agnosticism that separates a subject’s indecision and
her commitment to that indecision. Before doing so, let me first propose the
last requirement for an account of agnosticism.
vi. Revision: An account of agnosticism has to be able to explain the tran-
sition from agnosticism to other doxastic states (including non-agnostic
indecision) due to different kinds of defeaters.
Let’s see how such a change of mind can be described for a situation similar
to Friedman’s Nasa example, where the reason for one’s agnostic state has
been undercut but no prima facie reason for believing or disbelieving has been
provided in its place. I want to argue that the transition from agnosticism to
mere indecision is a substantial change of mind, even if this transition does not
change the fact that the subject is “still very much in the dark” (Friedman
19Friedman (2017) argued that a doxastic conflict between believing and suspending should
be possible: “But once we admit that doxastic conflict is possible, why shouldn’t we admit
that possibility in full generality? Just as a subject can be conflicted with respect to her
beliefs on some matter, she should be able to be conflicted with respect to her beliefs and
suspendings on some matter” (p. 305). Given that one wants to allow for a conflict between
one’s commitments that come with agnosticism and those that come with belief, then the
situation of the long-term agnostic who adopted a belief I spelt out above seems to be a
plausible case. Having said this, I am reluctant to call this a proper conflict between belief
and agnosticism.
20The distinction between undercutting and rebutting defeaters goes back to John Pollock’s
theory of defeasible inference (Pollock 1987).
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2013a: 176) about the truth of the proposition in question. How can attitude
accounts of agnosticism explain this change of mind?
To discuss the transition from agnosticism to mere indecision, let me intro-
duce Marta: Marta entered the agnostic state with regard to Martian life at
time t1 for the prima facie reason that technical limitations make it impossible
to determine whether or not there is life on Mars. At some later time, t2, she
learns about Nasa’s new method, which can clearly determine whether or not
there is life on Mars. Let us assume that Nasa will host a press conference
later that day where the results will be released, but they are kept secret until
then. Sure, Marta could just remain agnostic, but it is also plausible that Marta
gives up her agnosticism in this situation and starts deliberating anew whether
Martians exist while desperately waiting for the results to be released. How can
Marta’s change of mind be explained by the two accounts I discussed before?
In virtue of what is Marta withdrawing her commitment to indecision while
remaining undecided?
According to the sui generis approach, Marta entered the state of agnosti-
cism by adopting the attitude of ‘being agnostic’ for the reason that technical
limitations prevent any insight with respect to life on Mars. When this rea-
son was undercut by Nasa’s announcement of its new technique, Marta (being
rational) revised her doxastic stance by giving up her attitude of ‘being agnos-
tic’. Because the sui generis approach considers agnosticism to be a primitive
state that has no further structure, Marta cannot just revise her commitment to
indecision but keep the doxastic neutrality she originally exhibited before com-
mitting to it. For the sui generis approach, giving up her commitment comes
with giving up her (agnostic) indecision toward life on Mars. This does not seem
problematic if Marta is still undecided in the non-agnostic way that Friedman
calls “the indecision of mere non-belief”. However, because these two kinds of
indecision are independent from each other, there is no guarantee that Marta
actually is undecided in this way. And if she does turn out to be undecided
in this non-agnostic way, this is not necessarily the result of her giving up her
commitment to indecision because of an undercutting defeater. Again, the lack
of structure of the primitive state of being agnostic lacks explanatory force.
Marta’s case is more complicated when we apply it to the meta-cognitive
accounts I discussed in the previous section. Because Raleigh’s account provides
more details regarding the reasons involved, I will concentrate on his account
in this section. According to Raleigh, the meta-belief that one cannot yet tell
whether there is life on Mars given the evidence is the relevant reason that
motivates and explains Marta’s commitment to indecision. Hence, if this reason
is lost and the subject is rational, she will give up this commitment and leave
the agnostic state.
Let us assume that Marta formed the meta-cognitive belief (that she cannot
tell whether there is life on Mars given her evidence) solely for the reason that
technical limitations make it impossible to determine whether or not there is
life on Mars. It is this latter reason that motivates and explains Marta’s meta-
cognitive belief. When she finds out that Nasa has developed a new technique
that can resolve the issue, Marta’s reason for her meta-cognitive belief is defeated
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(or more precisely: undercut). What does Marta have to do from a rational point
of view? Since she lost her sole reason for her meta-cognitive belief, Marta
is rationally required to drop it. Consequently, by dropping the meta-belief,
Marta loses the sole reason that motivated and explained her doxastic neutrality:
“within the complex state of suspending judgement, one constituent – the meta-
cognitive belief – is the subject’s reason for the other constituent – the doxastic
neutrality” (Raleigh 2021, p. 2457). In the end, it seems, that, according to this
view, Marta has to give up not only her commitment to doxastic neutrality but
also her doxastic neutrality altogether. This is a strange result because Marta
still lacks any prima facie reason to believe or disbelieve that there is life on
Mars.
Maybe one could avoid this problem by saying that Marta does not have
to give up her meta-belief because even after Nasa’s announcement it is still
true that Marta cannot tell whether there is life on Mars. This reply, however,
would commit the meta-cognitivist to the view that there are no undercutting
defeaters for agnosticism in general. This would mean that the meta-belief that
one’s evidence regarding p’s truth is deficient can, by definition, only be defeated
by a prima facie reason that speaks for believing or disbelieving that p is true.
According to this view, it would not be possible for a subject to revise her
agnosticism regarding p without adopting a belief or a disbelief that p is true.
I do not think that this is an appropriate description of what is going on in
Marta’s case. An account of agnosticism has to provide for the possibility that
subjects retract their former commitment but nonetheless retain the doxastic
neutrality they started with before having committed to it.21
1.2.4 Summing Up
In the first part of the paper, I introduced six requirements for the intuitive
view that suspension is the relevant act or event that commits the subject to
indecision and terminates inquiry such that the subject enters the settled state
of agnosticism. Although the first three requirements, which I dedicated to
Jane Friedman (Cognitive Contact, Proper End and Lost Reason), do not pose
a problem for attitude accounts like the sui generis account or meta-cognitive
accounts, the requirements of Commitment and Revision, which concern the
transition between mere indecision and agnosticism, create problems for both
accounts.
The main problem with a sui generis account is that a primitive state of ag-
nosticism lacks any kind of internal structure that could account for a subject’s
indecision and her commitment to that indecision as separate. I have argued
that the sui generis approach lacks explanatory power with regard to what a
subject does when she commits to indecision for a reason given that committing
to indecision is understood as a commitment to the neutral doxastic state the
subject is already in (I referred to this as “de facto indecision”). Similarly, a sui
generis approach cannot explain the transition from agnosticism to mere inde-
21Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for having me clarify this point.
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cision as a form of retracting the former commitment to one’s indecision such
that, by default, the subject ends up being merely undecided again. This re-
traction of one’s former commitment (e.g. in the face of undercutting defeaters)
is only explainable if the indecision and the commitment to it can be told apart.
Further, Friedman’s sui generis account assumes two different kinds of doxastic
indecision that are supposed to be psychologically independent from each other.
It is not intuitive, I think, that the merely undecided and the agnostic subject
are undecided about the truth of some matter in fundamentally different ways.
Rather, I take it, agnostic indecision is a qualified or settled form of indecision.
In general, meta-cognitive accounts are able to provide the required internal
structure to distinguish the subject’s indecision (the joint absence of belief and
disbelief) and her commitment to that indecision (the meta-belief about her
deficient evidential situation). The main worry I have about meta-cognitivist
accounts is that believing (that one is in an epistemically deficient situation)
is not the right kind of attitude that settles the subject’s indecision and brings
inquiry to an end. Having beliefs about one’s doxastic state and one’s deficient
evidential situation is compatible with ending inquiry, but it is also compatible
with starting inquiry or inquiring further. Something else needs to be added to
the meta-cognitive view that provides this extra step toward agnosticism.
It is possible that the concerns I raised with respect to both attitude accounts
can be explained away by suggesting that there are different kinds of suspension,
some of which are inquiry-opening and other that are inquiry-closing. Indeed,
I think that there are different kinds of suspension and that they allow for
different interpretations of what it is to commit to indecision for a reason, as
I discussed in 1.2.2. Possibly, the neutrality Raleigh and Friedman are after
is restricted to inquiry-opening or inquiry-guiding attitudes only, and there is
nothing wrong with that. When it comes to agnosticism as a settled state,
however, I argued that only inquiry-ending suspension can provide the relevant
step to agnosticism.
Friedman addresses the “feeling that suspension of judgment is something
that comes at the end of inquiry: after a struggle to answer some question one
finally gives up and suspends”. She rejects this view partly because it would
then be “impossible to inquire into Q while being suspended about Q” (p. 313).
I welcome the result that the kind of suspension that leads to the settled state
of agnosticism is incompatible with inquiry. By reopening a question, one’s
doxastic state of agnosticism is unsettled. This is what happens when Marta
(see 1.2.3) revises her agnosticism by retracting her commitment to indecision
because the reason for which she suspended originally has been undercut. How-
ever, I agree with Friedman that it seems to be wrong to say that no kind
of suspension is compatible with inquiry. Surely, it is wise to suspend while
inquiring in the sense of staying clear of premature conclusions against one’s
inclinations to make an early call. But this state is not the state of the agnostic
subject that settled on a neutral opinion.
For my own account of agnosticism, I will suggest in the next section that the
agnostic committed to her de facto indecision by forming an evaluative attitude
that has her own indecision as its object. This endorsing attitude neither brings
19
the subject’s indecision causally about nor does it explain the indecision. Thus,
the subject can take back the commitment to indecision and start inquiring
again without giving up her indecision altogether. I will elaborate on this in the
next section.
2 A Two-Component Analysis of Agnosticism
The mental state of agnosticism, I want to suggest, has to be analysed as a
complex state that consists of a structural relation between two components:
one component is the subject’s doxastic indecision and the other component is
the commitment that is directed at her own indecision. The indecision is not
explained or motivated by the commitment but evaluated by it. Indecision, I
think, is best captured conservatively by the doxastic state of non-belief with
regard to a proposition with which one has, or has had, cognitive contact. The
commitment to indecision, so I will argue, is provided by the formation of the
inquiry-closing attitude of endorsement. These two components stand in the
following relation to each other:
2-C analysis: A subject S is agnostic with regard to the truth of a
proposition p if and only if S is in the doxastic state of indecision regarding
p and endorses the fact that she is in that state.
I will first explain the doxastic state of indecision and then the evaluative
attitude of endorsement. After that, I will explain how this account meets all
six requirements I have spelt out in the first part and how it avoids the problems
I raised for meta-cognitive and sui generis accounts of agnosticism.
2.1 Indecision and Non-belief
I will start with my definition of indecision:
Indecision: A subject S is undecided with regard to the truth of a propo-
sition p if and only if (1) S neither believes nor disbelieves that p and (2)
S is or was in cognitive contact with p.
Note that my definition of indecision has the same necessary and jointly suf-
ficient conditions that Hájek and Wedgwood suggested for agnosticism. Mere
non-belief, I take it, is not only insufficient for agnosticism, but also insufficient
for indecision. It is correct that cavemen are in the state of non-belief with
regard to the proposition that quarks exist, because they neither believe nor
disbelieve that quarks exist; but the absence of both a believing and a disbe-
lieving attitude alone may suffice for them being deeply ignorant, but it does not
make them undecided with respect to the truth of that proposition. Indecision
with regard to p requires that the subject be, in some minimal sense at least,
concerned about p’s truth but has not yet formed any settled doxastic attitude
with respect to p.
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With this notion of indecision it is left open why the subject has not formed
a doxastic attitude yet. Given that indecision requires cognitive contact, it can
be ascribed to subjects at various stages of a deliberation process regarding the
truth of some proposition: the doxastic state of indecision seems to be the de-
fault state of a subject who starts deliberating about the truth of a proposition
which she entertains in thought for the first time. Further, a subject who is
in the middle of accumulating evidence but has not reached a verdict yet can
be described as doxastically undecided or in the state of pre-decision or mid-
wondering. Next, the doxastic state of indecision is a natural fallback position
for subjects who gave up their belief, disbelief, or agnosticism because of un-
dercutting defeaters that undermined their respective doxastic stance. Even if
these stages of inquiry differ in the subject being more or less informed, they are
all uncommitted stages and hence qualify for non-agnostic or ‘mere’ indecision.
My account of agnosticism as endorsed indecision may appear, at first glance,
very close to the meta-cognitive idea that a second-order belief about one’s defi-
cient evidential situation is the crucial agnostic element. It is important to note,
however, that the role of a subject’s indecision within my account of agnosticism
is very different from that within other accounts insofar as I do not take inde-
cision to be the result of something subjects do, such as forming the attitude
of ‘being agnostic’. Rather, I argue that agnostic subjects committed to the
indecision they already exhibited. Even if I am aware of my own indecision by
judging my evidential situation to be insufficient, I am not necessarily agnos-
tic. As I explained in previous sections, the agnostic subject assesses the fact
that she is undecided and thereby closes inquiry. A further step is needed for
this (admittedly reflective) undecided subject to become agnostic. This further
step is the formation of the endorsement attitude which is not a doxastic but
rather an evaluative attitude. In the next section, I will explain this attitude
of endorsement and the kind of commitment that is involved in settling one’s
indecision.
2.2 The Attitude of Endorsement
The attitude of endorsement, which I introduced in the beginning of Section 2,
is meant to be an evaluative attitude by which a subject assesses and approves of
the fact that she is in a certain doxastic state regarding p. I take endorsing to be
an inquiry-closing attitude: a subject endorses her indecision if and only if the
evaluation is such that inquiry into the truth of p is stopped. By endorsing one’s
indecision the subject, in some sense at least, identifies with (or commits to) her
being in the state of indecision and brings inquiry to an end. This explains why
agnosticism is a settled or calm state of mind, and it is in accordance with the
traditional interpretation of the ‘a-gnostic’ being a person who does not know,
but who reflected on this fact and is content with this situation.
The attitude of endorsement is directed at one’s own de facto doxastic state
of indecision: endorsing one’s indecision is taking it to be appropriate to neither
believe nor disbelieve that p is true such that inquiry into p’s truth is stopped.
Note that the endorsement attitude is not in itself an attitude that represents
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agnosticism or any form of indecision. Subjects can endorse different doxastic
states they are in: a subject can also assess her beliefs from a meta-perspective
and endorse them accordingly. Endorsing one’s de facto belief is taking it to be
appropriate to believe that p such that inquiry into the truth (or appropriate-
ness) of p-belief is stopped.22 However, only if S endorses her de facto indecision
regarding p and stops inquiry into p, will this endorsement be constitutive for
the complex phenomenon of agnosticism with regard to p. Not only the forma-
tion of the attitude of endorsement is constitutive of agnosticism, but also the
special object of the attitude.
To endorse one’s own indecision with respect to p, it is required that subjects
know or be aware of their indecision with regard to p. Usually, people express
indecision by saying or thinking ‘I don’t know’, ‘I can’t say’, ‘I’m stuck’, or ‘I
can’t figure it out’. Non-agnostic indecision may be silent and may go unnoticed,
but often people are painfully aware that they are undecided, especially when
it matters to them to find the answer to a nagging question but they don’t have
the means to do so. Experiencing this mental unease is one way of finding out
about one’s own (unwelcome) indecision. Knowing about one’s own indecision
may be necessary for agnosticism, but it is not sufficient: S may be aware of
her indecision about some issue but may go on deliberating about it without
ever committing to that indecision of hers. To commit to indecision, S has to
do something with this knowledge (or meta-belief) about her own indecision.
I want to suggest that this last step to agnosticism, which may (but does not
have to be) motivated by the aforementioned meta-belief, is the formation of
the attitude of endorsement with respect to one’s indecision. By endorsing her
indecision, S settles or commits to her indecision regarding p for a reason. She
stops deliberating whether p is true and takes a stance toward her doxastic
situation regarding p without thereby answering the question whether p.
The settling of the indecision is separable from the indecision itself because
the indecision is not a causal-explanatory result of the formation of the endorse-
ment attitude but rather its object. By forming the endorsement attitude with
respect to her indecision, S does not bring about her indecision but only com-
mits to the fact that she is undecided such that inquiry is closed. This structural
relation of indecision and its endorsement allows for a smooth transition from
mere indecision to agnosticism (Commitment) and back again (Revision). As
in Marta’s case, subjects can take back their commitment to indecision when
they learn that they have been mistaken or that the evidential situation has
changed. In cases like Marta’s, the subject’s doxastic stance is unsettled and
falls back to mere or unqualified indecision. Undercutting defeaters do the same
with respect to unsettling a subject in her beliefs: S drops the belief that p is
true without thereby believing p to be false. The natural fallback position for
responding to undercutting defeaters is indecision.
The suggested separation of a subject’s indecision and the commitment to
her indecision further offers a plausible explanation of how non-epistemic reasons
22Arguably, the attitude of endorsement could be defined in more general terms to capture
the assessment of non-doxastic states from a meta-perspective. This, however, would also
require a redefinition of the kind of commitment that comes with it.
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may motivate a subject’s agnosticism and why this does not necessarily render
agnosticism a non-doxastic state. It seems plausible that, sometimes, subjects
suspend for pragmatic reasons, for example, when it is too difficult, risky, or
time consuming to find appropriate evidence that determines whether or not p
is true. This is not to say that people can suspend at will no matter what the
evidence looks like. Because I analyse suspension as endorsed indecision, the
subject has to be in the state of indecision regarding the issue in question to
be able to endorse this de facto state of hers in the first place. To put it more
simply, a subject cannot endorse her state of indecision if she is not in that state.
Yet, even if S cannot be undecided for pragmatic reasons, S can endorse her
indecision for pragmatic reasons, for example, when S expects further inquiry
to be too costly and not productive. These cases that have to be distinguished
from cases of self-deceit, deliberate ignorance, and blind refusal to inquire. In
this paper, however, I will not pursue this topic further.23
In contrast to a sui generis attitude, which is merely defined to represent the
subject’s indecision as well as the commitment without any further structure
regarding their relation, a two-component analysis has the required structure to
explain what is going on when a subject enters the state of agnosticism by sus-
pending inquiry. Agnosticism can be distinguished from mere indecision without
assuming that there are psychologically different kinds of being undecided re-
garding the truth of a proposition. Further, my account adds the required step
that allows the use of a meta-belief about one’s evidential situation as a reason
to suspend. This is the step that is essentially lacking in pure meta-cognitive
accounts.
2.3 Normative Profile of Endorsed Indecision
Let me briefly point at some implications of my account for the rational profile
of agnosticism.24 Given the two components of agnosticism I described above,
there are two points of reference for its rationality: one concerns the rationality
of indecision simpliciter and the other concerns the rational endorsement of that
indecision. How do the two interact with one another?
The rationality of indecision simpliciter is clearly epistemic. It is rational for
S to be undecided regarding the truth of p if S has no or insufficient evidence
because it is impermissible for S to believe or disbelieve a proposition against
the evidence or on insufficient grounds. Further, it is rational to be undecided
if one’s total body of evidence is equally balanced because it is impermissible
to believe or disbelieve in the presence of defeaters. One might also think of a
subject as irrationally undecided regarding p’s truth if she intentionally avoids
reviewing available facts that are potentially relevant for a decision regarding
p’s truth.
There are a lot of questions concerning the rationality of endorsing one’s
indecision. Is it permissible to just endorse one’s de facto indecision as it is
23I said more on this in Wagner (forthcoming) .
24I want to thank an anonymous reviewer for making this suggestion.
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and not check on it against the body of evidence there is or there could be? In
any case, it seems reasonable to endorse one’s indecision as appropriate and end
inquiry if one judges that one considered all the evidence there is and is still
unable to decide the issue. However, as I said before, I think that the subject
can commit to indecision for pragmatic considerations, too, and I think that,
pragmatically, this is often rationally permissible.25 Even if that would mean
that the endorsement attitude itself is not a doxastic attitude, the resulting
state of agnosticism, which requires that the subject be doxastically undecided,
still is. Further, there are rationality constraints with respect to the transition
from agnosticism to belief: as I briefly mentioned in the context of Revision,
it is impermissible for a subject to stick to her past commitment to indecision
if she is not undecided any more. By adopting a belief that p is true, she is
rationally obliged to retract her commitment to her past indecision. In 1.2.3, I
gave an example of a subject who violates this obligation by sticking to her past
commitment to her former indecision regarding p despite now having adopted
the (in this case painful) belief that p is true.
Clearly, a subject is permitted to endorse her indecision only if she is unde-
cided about p, but it might be superfluous to require a subject not to be doing
something that seems impossible anyway. It is an interesting question, though,
whether there are epistemic circumstances that could possibly obligate a subject
to endorse her indecision and enter the agnostic state. I have my doubts that
there are purely epistemic obligations for being agnostic that come on top of
being doxastically neutral in the sense of ’mere’ indecision. This, however, is
not the place to pursue these questions further.
2.4 Testing the Requirements
I will quickly go through the requirements I spelt out in the first part to show
that my account is able to meet them all.
Cognitive Contact: My account of settled indecision makes sure that S can-
not be agnostic toward a proposition p if she is not (and never was) cognitively
considering p’s truth because the mental state of indecision is defined as the
state of non-belief plus cognitive contact (see Section 2.1).
Proper End: My account of settled indecision is able to explain the dif-
ference between subjects who close deliberation by suspending and those who
either drop out prematurely or close deliberation in some other way than by
suspending. The latter two cases would be such that the subject will not have
ended deliberation by endorsing her own indecision. The approval of her own
indecision that comes with the endorsement marks the proper end of a delib-
eration process that moves the subject into the state of agnosticism. Subjects
may do all kinds of things to end deliberation (intentionally or not), but only
25In Wagner (forthcoming) , I say more about pragmatic reasons for suspension.
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the evaluation of one’s indecision to be the appropriate doxastic response ends
it in the proper way that leads to agnosticism.
Lost Reasons: Because the attitude of endorsement is a standing attitude,
which can be separated from the reasons for which it was formed, my account
meets this requirement. A subject can endorse her own indecision, for example
for the reason that the prospect of decisive future evidence is rather dim, and
then remain in that state of agnosticism even if, one day, her reason is defeated
or she forgets about it.
Doxastic Neutrality: Indecision is captured in my account by two necessary
conditions that are jointly sufficient: S neither believes nor disbelieves that p
and S is or was in cognitive contact with p. The agnostic subject is doxastically
neutral regarding p’s truth in the same way as the merely undecided subject is.
The difference between the two is not the kind of indecision or how it has been
brought about; they differ with respect to their present or absent assessment of
their de facto indecision.
Commitment: My interpretation of “attitudinal commitment to indecision”
is as follows: S commits to her de facto indecision by evaluating it as appro-
priate and thereby stops inquiry. This means that the indecision is the object
of the endorsement attitude but not its causal result. The commitment does
not bring about or explain the indecision itself, but only qualifies it as appro-
priate such that inquiry is stopped. A subject who commits to indecision by
endorsing it identifies with her own indecision and adopts her indecision as her
own. Committing to indecision in this way is the relevant step toward a settled
agnostic state that the merely undecided subject does not take.
Revision: My account of agnosticism is able to explain the transition from be-
ing agnostic to other doxastic states (including non-agnostic indecision) prompt-
ed by different kinds of defeaters because it has two independent components
that are only structurally related. Whereas rebutting defeaters prompt the (ra-
tional) subject to revise the component of indecision (e.g. by adopting a belief),
undercutting defeaters will only be able to unsettle the agnostic’s commitment
to indecision but not her indecision as such. My two-component analysis can
capture and explain Marta’s change of mind from agnosticism to mere indeci-
sion, because the indecision-representing aspect of agnosticism is not constituted
by the special qualification that comes with the endorsement attitude. Marta
can give up the endorsement of her indecision without giving up her indecision
altogether.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, I attempted to spell out a descriptive account of agnosticism that
accommodates the intuitive view that a subject moves into the state of agnos-
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ticism by an act (we call suspension) that terminates deliberation in the right
way. I started with discussing three requirements for an appropriate account
of agnosticism (Cognitive Contact, Proper End, Lost Reasons) that I dedicated
to Jane Friedman (2013b), who convincingly argued that it is the formation
of an attitude that is best suited to capturing this transition from an unde-
cided deliberative state to the state of agnosticism. I then introduced three
further requirements (Doxastic Neutrality, Commitment, Revision) on the basis
of which I compared meta-cognitive accounts and sui generis attitude accounts
of agnosticism. Even though the two rivalling accounts have different problems
in accommodating these requirements, the problems stem from the same source:
both accounts analyse the agnostic’s commitment to indecision as a commitment
that brings about the indecision as its result.
In my own account, I addressed the indecision and the commitment to inde-
cision as independent components that are only structurally related. A subject
who commits to indecision endorses the fact that she is undecided with regard
to that issue. I take the act of suspension to be the formation of the endorse-
ment attitude with respect to one’s own indecision. This evaluation of one’s own
indecision as the appropriate doxastic response brings deliberation to an end.
Let me close with the metaphor I brought up in the introduction: in some sense,
the suggested settled form of indecision works like two-component glue. Because
the hardener and the resin are packed in separate cartridges, the hardener does
not bring about the resin, but if the two are mixed together appropriately, the
resin’s chemical structure is stabilised via a chemical reaction. Likewise, the
subject’s commitment to her own indecision does not bring about that she is
undecided but only stabilises, or settles, her de facto indecision. Unfortunately,
the glue metaphor is not perfect because the chemical reaction is irreversible.
This is not the case for one’s commitment to indecision. Agnosticism can be
revised by adopting a belief but also by giving up the endorsement of one’s in-
decision. If a subject’s agnosticism is unsettled by undercutting defeaters, she
can take back the commitment of her indecision without thereby giving up her
indecision altogether.
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